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Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

DETAILED ACTION

1. This written action is responding to the amendment dated on 09/27/2006.
2. Claims 1-6, 9-23, and 25-26 have been submitted for examination.
3. Claims 1-6, 9-23, and 25-26 have been examined and rejected.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.

4. Claims 1, 18, 21, and 25-26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by Krause et al. (U.S. Patent 6,070,198).

a. Referring to Claim 1:

As per Claim 1, Krause et al. disclose a method of improving security processing in a computing network, comprising:

providing security processing in an operating system kernel [**Kernel space 104 includes stream head 110, encryptor module 112 (lines 38-40, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Kernel space 124 includes stream head 130, encryption multiplexor 132, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, DLPI layer 138, and encryptor driver 140 (lines 46-48, Col. 6 and Fig. 3);**

providing an application program which makes use of the operating system kernel during execution [In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The system call invokes a copyin() function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104 (lines 41-45, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). FIG. 3 is a diagram of a computer system 120 showing another embodiment of the present invention. Computer system 120 includes user space 122 and kernel space 124. User space 122 includes user application 126 and socket 128. Kernel space 124 includes stream head 130, encryption multiplexor 132, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, DLPI layer 138, and encryptor driver 140. User application 126, socket 128, stream head 130, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, and DLPI layer 138 operate in a manner similar to correspondingly named components in FIG. 2 (lines 45-51, Col. 6)];

executing the application program [Execution of the user application 126 (lines 59-60, Col. 7)];

selectably securing at least one communication of the executing application program with a remotely executing application program using the provided security processing in the operating system kernel [This invention relates to data communications within and between

computer systems. More particularly, this invention relates to providing data communications within and between computer systems using a modified protocol stack that encrypts and decrypts data as the data flows through the protocol stack (lines 16-21, Col. 1 and Fig. 2 and 3). Prior art cryptography packages, such as the Secured Socket Library (SSL) specification v. 3.0, serve several purposes. Such packages determine the encryption technique to be employed, determine the public and private keys to be used, and route data to and from the encryption technology. The present invention retains these features, and provides several new benefits. For example, a single common interface is used for both network communications and cryptographic technology (lines 29-37, Col. 16). In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection (lines 41-42, Col. 5); *where computers communicate data for the applications through the network.* Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms, or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 112 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Dynamic function replacement allows a module to have alternate execution paths. By issuing a command, different

functions can be switched into and out of a STREAMS-based protocol stack on the fly. Dynamic function replacement is an ideal mechanism for providing a TCP/IP stack with the ability to selectively encrypt and decrypt data flowing through the stack (lines 48-54, Col. 8 and Fig. 3)];

providing, in the security processing, support for at least one security directive [The present invention adds two STREAMS ioctl commands that allow user application 36 to configure encryption, and are also useful in other dynamic function registration applications. The ioctl command I_GET_FUNC_REG is transmitted by application 36 via stream head 40 to each driver and module in the protocol stack. Each driver and module in the stack returns a function registration list containing a character name and a unique identifier for each possible function, thereby notifying user application 36 of the existence of all functions that can be registered (lines 30-31, Col. 13)]; and

invoking, during execution of the provided application program, the at least one security directive, wherein selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program is performed in response to the invocation of the at least one security directive [In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by

invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The system call invokes a copyin() function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104. Encryptor module 112 encrypts the data, TCP layer 114 and IP layer 116 perform processing in accordance with the TCP/IP protocol, and DLPI layer 118 initiates a DMA operation that provides the data to the physical network hardware (lines 41-50, Col. 5). Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 112 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5). In addition, computer 100 can be configured to add encryption to any TCP/IP stack using the STREAMS autopush facility. The autopush facility allows modules to be automatically pushed on the stack by the operating system whenever predefined types of stacks are opened. For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 65-67, Col. 5 and lines 1-6, Col. 6). For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 2-6, Col. 6).

The present invention adds two STREAMS ioctl commands that allow user application 36 to configure encryption, and are also useful in other dynamic function registration applications. The ioctl command I_GET_FUNC_REG is transmitted by application 36 via stream head 40 to each driver and module in the protocol stack. Each driver and module in the stack returns a function registration list containing a character name and a unique identifier for each possible function, thereby notifying user application 36 of the existence of all functions that can be registered (lines 30-31, Col. 13)].

b. Referring to Claim 18:

As per Claim 18, Krause et al. disclose the method according claim 1, Krause et al. further disclose wherein the provided application program comprises security directives that invoke the security processing, and further comprising: Intercepting, in the provided security processing, the security directives [application 12 must first encrypt the data by sending unencrypted data to encryptor 18 via secured socket 16. Typically, this is accomplished by user application 12 invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The secured socket library associated with secured socket 16 maps the send() command to an implementation-specific write command that provides encryptor 18 with the data to be encrypted. After the data

has been encrypted, user application 12 invokes a system call to retrieve the encrypted data, such as a `recv()` command. The `recv()` command is mapped to an implementation-specific read command that retrieves the encrypted data from encryptor 18, and the encrypted data is then provided to user application 12. Thereafter, user application 12 transmits the encrypted data over the network by sending the encrypted data to stream head 22 via socket 14 by invoking another system call (such as another `send()` command). From stream head 22, the encrypted data flows through TCP layer 24, IP layer 26, and DLPI layer 28 (lines 66-67, Col. 2 and lines 1-18, Col. 3). In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by invoking a system call, such as a `send()` command. The system call invokes a `copyin()` function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104. Encryptor module 112 encrypts the data (lines 41-46, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 12 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5). In addition, computer 100 can be configured to add encryption to any TCP/IP

stack using the STREAMS autopush facility. The autopush facility allows modules to be automatically pushed on the stack by the operating system whenever predefined types of stacks are opened. For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 65-67, Col. 5 and lines 1-6, Col. 6). For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 2-6, Col. 6). The present invention adds two STREAMS ioctl commands that allow user application 36 to configure encryption, and are also useful in other dynamic function registration applications. The ioctl command I_GET_FUNC_REG is transmitted by application 36 via stream head 40 to each driver and module in the protocol stack. Each driver and module in the stack returns a function registration list containing a character name and a unique identifier for each possible function, thereby notifying user application 36 of the existence of all functions that can be registered (lines 30-31, Col. 13)]; and

executing, responsive to the interception, corresponding security function [Encryptor module 112 encrypts the data using software-based algorithms, or hardware-based algorithms (lines 57-58, Col.

5). Dynamic function replacement allows a module to have alternate execution paths. By issuing a command, different functions can be switched into and out of a STREAMS-based protocol stack on the fly. Dynamic function replacement is an ideal mechanism for providing a TCP/IP stack with the ability to selectively encrypt and decrypt data flowing through the stack (lines 48-54, Col. 8 and Fig. 3)].

c. Referring to Claim 21:

As per Claim 21, Krause et al. discloses the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. further disclose the provided security processing operates in a Transmission Control Protocol layer of the operating system kernel [In addition, compute 100 can be configured to add encryption to any TCP/IP stack using the STREAMS autopush facility. The autopush facility allows modules to be automatically pushed on the stack by the operating system whenever predefined types of stacks are open (lines 65-67, Col. 5, lines 1-2, Col. 6, and Fig. 2 and 3)].

d. Referring to Claim 25:

As per Claim 25, it encompasses limitations that are similar to those of the method Claim 1. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 1 above. In additional, Krause et al. disclose a system for improving security processing in a computing network [This

invention relates to data communications within and between computer systems. More particularly, this invention relates to providing data communications within and between computer systems using a modified protocol stack that encrypts and decrypts data as the data flows through the protocol stack (lines 16-21, Col. 1). A single common interface is used for both network communications and cryptographic technology, thereby simplifying user applications (lines 35-38, Col. 16)].

e. Referring to Claim 26:

As per Claim 26, it encompasses limitations that are similar to those of the method Claim 1. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 1 above. In additional, Krause et al. disclose a computer program product for improving security processing in a computing network, the computer program product embodied on at least one computer-readable media **[A program storage medium readable by a computer tangibly embodying a program of instructions executable by the computer to perform a cryptographic function (lines 7-9, Col. 21)].**

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

5. Claims 2-6, 9-17, 19, and 22-23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Krause et al. (U.S. Patent 6,070,198) and further in view of Mod_SSL manual (Apache mod_ssl version 2.6).

a. Referring to Claim 2:

As per Claim 2, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 1. In addition, Krause et al. further disclose the step of configuring at least one port used by the provided application program such that communications using the at least one port are to be secured [The replacement put function can also be constructed to scan for TPI T_BIND_REQ messages. TPI T_BIND_REQ messages are used to bind an application to a specified protocol stack and port. In a manner similar to that described above, the replacement put function can determine what level of encryption is required, determine the encryption keys, and register the encryption function at the stream head (lines 4-10, Col. 14). For example, a single common interface is used for both network communications and cryptographic technology, thereby simplifying user applications (lines 35-38, Col. 16)]; and

wherein selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program and using the at least one port [Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms, or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 112 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Dynamic function replacement allows a module to have alternate execution paths. By issuing a command, different functions can be switched into and out of a STREAMS-based protocol stack on the fly. Dynamic function replacement is an ideal mechanism for providing a TCP/IP stack with the ability to selectively encrypt and decrypt data flowing through the stack (lines 48-54, Col. 8 and Fig. 3). The replacement put function can also be constructed to scan for TPI T_BIND_REQ messages. TPI T_BIND_REQ messages are used to bind an application to a specified protocol stack and port. In a manner similar to that described above, the replacement put function can determine what level of encryption is required, determine the encryption keys, and register the encryption function at the stream head (lines 4-10, Col. 14)].

Krause et al. discloses selectably securing the at least one communication as in Claim 1. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose wherein selectably securing then secures all communications. Mod_SSL manual discloses selectably securing can secure all communications when the security engine is turned on [i.e., **SSLEngine on** (line 19, pg. 6 of Chapter 3). **This directive toggles the usage of the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine. This is usually used inside a <VirtualHost> section to enable SSL/TLS for a particular virtual host. By default the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine is disabled for both the main server and all configured virtual hosts (lines 26-28, pg. 6 of Chapter 3), the security function, SSLEngine, would be applied to all the application or data once it is toggled on**]. Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual since one would be motivated to have SSL Engine configured for securing the network communication between client and server (line 37, pg. 5 of Chapter 2 from Mod_SSL module) all the time and support backward compatibility to other SSL solutions (line 5, pg. 1 of Chapter 4 from Mod_SSL manual). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. with Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 2.

b. Referring to Claim 3:

As per Claim 3, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 2. In addition, Krause et al. disclose wherein the provided application program does not include code for security processing [In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The system call invokes a copyin() function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104. Encryptor 112 encrypts the data (lines 41-46, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms, or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art (lines 57-59, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). FIG. 3 is a diagram of a computer system 120 showing another embodiment of the present invention. Computer system 120 includes user space 122 and kernel space 124. User space 122 includes user application 126 and socket 128. Kernel space 124 includes stream head 130, encryption multiplexor 132, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, DLPI layer 138, and encryptor driver 140. User application 126, socket 128, stream head 130, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, and DLPI layer 138 operate in a manner similar to correspondingly named components in FIG. 2 (lines 45-51, Col. 6 and Fig. 3). By using the present invention, data can be encrypted

using keys provided by the kernel, in contrast to the application (lines 28-30, Col. 4). In addition, the user application does not have to support encryption (lines 32-33, Col. 4); *the application program pass the data to the kernel space for security process since it does not provide the security process*].

c. Referring to Claim 4:

As per Claim 4, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 2. In addition, Krause et al. disclose configuring at least one port further comprises specifying information to be used in selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program [Encryptor module 112 encrypts data using software-based algorithms or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 112 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5). In addition, computer 100 can be configured to add encryption to any TCP/IP stack using the STREAMS autopush facility. The autopush facility allows modules to be automatically pushed on the stack by the operating system whenever predefined types of stacks are opened. For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after

TCP layer 114 (lines 65-67, Col. 5 and lines 1-6, Col. 6). For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 2-6, Col. 6). The present invention adds two STREAMS ioctl commands that allow user application 36 to configure encryption, and are also useful in other dynamic function registration applications. The ioctl command I_GET_FUNC_REG is transmitted by application 36 via stream head 40 to each driver and module in the protocol stack. Each driver and module in the stack returns a function registration list containing a character name and a unique identifier for each possible function, thereby notifying user application 36 of the existence of all functions that can be registered. Using this information, user application 36 can issue the second ioctl command, I_SET_FUNC_REG, which allows user application 36 to register a function (lines 30-31, Col. 13). The encryption key may be bound to the application instance, such that all data originating from a specific application uses a specific key (lines 25-28, Col. 7). the Secured Socket Library (SSL) specification v. 3.0 defined a protocol that allows a cryptographic package to pass messages between the package and the user application to configure how encryption and decryption will proceed, including the encryption

keys that will be used, the connections that will be encrypted, and the like (lines 66-67, Col. 6 and lines 1-4, Col. 7)].

d. Referring to Claim 5:

As per Claim 5, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 4. In addition, Mod_SSL manual disclose wherein the specified information comprises at least one of: authentication information; cipher suites options; and security key input information **[i.e., This complex directive uses a colon-separated cipher-spec string consisting of OpenSSL cipher specifications to configure Cipher Suit the client is permitted to negotiate in the SSL handshake phase (line 1-2, pg. 8 of Chapter 3)].**

e. Referring to Claim 6:

As per Claim 6, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 2. In addition, Mod_SSL manual disclose wherein configuring at least one port comprises at least one of: providing port definition statements; setting environment variables; and using job control language **[i.e., this module provides a lot of SSL information as additional environment variable to the SSI and CGI namespace. For backward compatibility the information can be made available under different names, too (lines 30-32, pg. 20 of Chapter 3)].**

f. Referring to Claim 9:

As per Claim 9, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. disclose the at least one security directive as in Claim 1. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose the at least one security directive comprises at least one: access capability for a client certificate; access capability for a client identifier; a request to start operation of selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program; and a request to stop operation of the selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program. However, Mod_SSL manual further discloses wherein the at least one security directive comprises at least one:

access capability for a client certificate; access capability for a client identifier; a request to start operation of selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program; and a request to stop operation of the selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program **[i.e., SSLEngine (line 16, pg. 6 of Chapter 3). This directive toggles the usage of the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine. This is usually used inside a <VirtualHost> section to enable SSL/TLS for a particular virtual host. By default the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine is disabled for both the main server and all configured virtual hosts (lines 26-28, pg. 6 of Chapter 3); where the SSL/TLS engine is used to provide the**

security process for the network communication involving the application data in pg. 9, Chapter 2 of the Mod_SSL manual].

Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to have various types of directives being supported as the security processing for the application since one would be motivated to know how a particular mod_ssl functionality is actually configured or activated (lines 3-4, pg. 1 of Chapter 3 from Mod_SSL manual). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 9.

g. Referring to Claim 10:

As per Claim 10, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. further disclose the step of invoking the at least one of the security directive and the executing application program as in Claim 1. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose the security directive comprises an access capability, a client certificate, and returning the client certification from the provided security processing in response to the invocation. However, Mod_SSL manual discloses the security directive comprises an access capability, a client certificate, and returning the client certification from the provided security

processing in response to the invocation [i.e., **SSLVerifyClient** (line 1, pg. 14 of Chapter 3). This directive sets the Certificate verification level for the Client Authentication. Notice that this directive can be used both in per-server and per-directory context. In per-server context it applies to the client authentication process used in the standard SSL handshake when a connection is established. In per-directory context it forces a SSL renegotiation with the reconfigured client verification level after the HTTP request was read but before the HTTP response is sent (lines 11-15, pg. 14 of Chapter 3); *the process of authentication means that the certificate is required to be accessed and then returned for verification*].

Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to have various types of directives being supported as the security processing for the application since one would be motivated to know how a particular mod_ssl functionality is actually configured or activated (lines 3-4, pg. 1 of Chapter 3 from Mod_SSL manual) and have the have the client authentication for the standard SSL handshake (lines 12-13, pg. 14 of Chapter 3). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 10.

h. Referring to Claim 11:

As per Claim 11, it encompasses limitations that are similar to those of method Claims 10. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 11 above. In addition, Mod_SSL manual discloses the client identification [i.e., **Certificate (line 11, pg. 14 of Chapter 3), where the certificate would contain a distinguished names as defined by the X.509 standard, and the distinguished name is used to provide an identity in a specific context (Table 2, pg. 3-4 in Chapter 2)**].

i. Referring to Claim 12:

As per Claim 12, the rejection of Claim 1 is incorporated. Claim 12 further encompasses limitations that are similar to those of method Claims 1, 2, and 9. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale as applied to Claims 1, 2, and 9. In addition, Mod_SSL manual discloses wherein selectably securing then secures all communications [i.e., **SSLEngine on (line 19, pg. 6 of Chapter 3). This directive toggles the usage of the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine. This is usually used inside a <VirtualHost> section to enable SSL/TLS for a particular virtual host. By default the SSL/TLS Protocol Engine is disabled for both the main server and all configured virtual hosts (lines 26-28, pg. 6 of Chapter 3), the security function, SSLEngine, would be applied to all the application or data once it is toggled on**].

j. Referring to Claim 13:

As per Claim 13, the rejection of Claim 1 is incorporated. Claim 13 further encompasses limitations that are similar to those of method Claims 1 and 9. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale as applied to Claims 1 and 9. In addition, Mod_SSL manual discloses wherein selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program then comprises stopping securing communications of the executing application program [i.e., **SSLEngine off** (line 19, pg. 6 of Chapter 3). This directive toggles the usage of the **SSL/TLS Protocol Engine**. This is usually used inside a **<VirtualHost>** section to enable **SSL/TLS** for a particular virtual host. By default the **SSL/TLS Protocol Engine** is disabled for both the main server and all configured virtual hosts (lines 26-28, pg. 6 of Chapter 3 and pg. 9, Chapter 2 of the Mod_SSL), *the security function, SSLEngine, would no longer be applied to all the data for application in the network communication when it is toggled off*].

k. Referring to Claim 14:

As per Claim 14, the rejection of Claim 12 is incorporated. In addition, Claim 14 encompasses limitations that are similar to those of the method Claim 4. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 4 above.

l. Referring to Claim 15:

As per Claim 15, the rejection of Claim 14 is incorporated. In addition, Claim 15 encompasses limitations that are similar to those of the method Claim 5. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 5 above.

m. Referring to Claim 16:

As per Claim 16, Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual disclose the method according to claim 12. Krause et al. further disclose a decision to invoke and the executing application program [In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The system call invokes a copyin() function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104. Encryptor module 112 encrypts the data (lines 41-45, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). FIG. 3 is a diagram of a computer system 120 showing another embodiment of the present invention. Computer system 120 includes user space 122 and kernel space 124. User space 122 includes user application 126 and socket 128. Kernel space 124 includes stream head 130, encryption multiplexor 132, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, DLPI layer 138, and encryptor driver 140. User application 126, socket 128, stream head 130, TCP layer 134, IP layer 136, and DLPI layer 138 operate in a manner similar to correspondingly named components in FIG. 2 (lines 45-

51, Col. 6); where the application program is executed and call to the encryptor at kernel for required data security].

n. Referring to Claim 17:

As per Claim 17, the rejection of Claim 12 is incorporated. Claim 17 encompasses limitations that are similar to those of the method Claim 16. Therefore, it is rejected with the same rationale applied against Claim 16 above. In addition, Mod_SSL manual discloses a security negotiation protocol [i.e., **The protocol is designed to support a range of choices for specific algorithms used for cryptography, digests, and signatures. This allows algorithm selection for specific servers to be made based on legal, export or other concerns, and also enables the protocol to take advantage of new algorithms. Choices are negotiated between client and server at the start of establishing a protocol session. (lines 38-42, pg. 5 of Chapter 2). SSLCipherSuite (line 29, pg. 7 of Chapter 3), where Cipher Suite available for negotiation in SSL handshake (line 30, pg. 7 of Chapter 3)].**

o. Referring to Claim 19:

As per Claim 19, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. further disclose wherein the provided application program comprises security directives that invoke the security processing **[application 12 must first encrypt the data by sending unencrypted**

data to encryptor 18 via secured socket 16. Typically, this is accomplished by user application 12 invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The secured socket library associated with secured socket 16 maps the send() command to an implementation-specific write command that provides encryptor 18 with the data to be encrypted. After the data has been encrypted, user application 12 invokes a system call to retrieve the encrypted data, such as a recv() command. The recv() command is mapped to an implementation-specific read command that retrieves the encrypted data from encryptor 18, and the encrypted data is then provided to user application 12. Thereafter, user application 12 transmits the encrypted data over the network by sending the encrypted data to stream head 22 via socket 14 by invoking another system call (such as another send() command). From stream head 22, the encrypted data flows through TCP layer 24, IP layer 26, and DLPI layer 28 (lines 66-67, Col. 2 and lines 1-18, Col. 3). In FIG. 2, when user application 106 desires to write data via a TCP/IP connection, application 106 transmits the data to socket 108 by invoking a system call, such as a send() command. The system call invokes a copyin() function that transfers data from user space 102 into kernel space 104. Encryptor module 112 encrypts the data (lines 41-46, Col. 5 and Fig. 2). Encryptor module 112 encrypts data

using software-based algorithms or hardware-based algorithms, as are known in the art. In addition, user application 106 can selectively add and remove encryption by pushing encryptor module 12 on the stack and pulling encryptor module 112 from the stack (lines 57-61, Col. 5). In addition, computer 100 can be configured to add encryption to any TCP/IP stack using the STREAMS autopush facility. The autopush facility allows modules to be automatically pushed on the stack by the operating system whenever predefined types of stacks are opened. For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 65-67, Col. 5 and lines 1-6, Col. 6). For example, with the autopush facility properly configured, whenever a user application opens a TCP/IP stack, an encryption module is also pushed onto the stack after TCP layer 114 (lines 2-6, Col. 6). The present invention adds two STREAMS ioctl commands that allow user application 36 to configure encryption, and are also useful in other dynamic function registration applications. The ioctl command I_GET_FUNC_REG is transmitted by application 36 via stream head 40 to each driver and module in the protocol stack. Each driver and module in the stack returns a function registration list containing a character name and

a unique identifier for each possible function, thereby notifying user application 36 of the existence of all functions that can be registered (lines 30-31, Col. 13)]. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose interpreting, in the provided security processing, the security directives as being non-operative. However, the Mod_SSL manual discloses the SSLRequire directive, which only allows the access when certain boolean condition is true [i.e., **SSLRequire (line 14, pg. 18 of Chapter 3) allow access only when an arbitrarily complex boolean expression is true (line 15, pg. 18 of Chapter 3); *This means that under certain conditions (depending on the setup of the expressions), the SSLRequire directive will be treated as disabled (non-operative)***]]. Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to determine Boolean condition since one would be motivated to have directive that specifies a general access requirement which has to be fulfilled in order to allow access (lines 23, pg. 18 of Chapter 3 from Mod_SSL manual), which functions similarly to the process of interpreting whether the call is operative or non-operative. Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 19.

p. Referring to Claim 22:

As per Claim 22, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose wherein the provided security processing implements Secure Socket Layer. However, Mod_SSL manual discloses the module can provide security as secure socket layer [i.e., **This module provides strong cryptography for the Apache (v1.3) webserver via the Secure Socket Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols (lines 1-3, pg. 1 of Chapter 1)**]. Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to realize the security process can either be implemented as SSL or TLS since one would be motivated to establish the server environment such that the clients can only connect with one of the provided protocols (lines 8-9, pg. 7 of Chapter 3 from Mod_SSL manual). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 22.

q. Referring to Claim 23:

As per Claim 23, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 1. Krause et al. do not expressly disclose wherein the provided security processing implements Transport Layer Security. However, Mod_SSL

manual discloses the module can provide security as transport layer security [i.e., **This module provides strong cryptography for the Apache (v1.3) webserver via the Secure Socket Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols (lines 1-3, pg. 1 of Chapter 1)**]. Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to realize the security process can either be implemented as SSL or TLS since one would be motivated to establish the server environment such that the clients can only connect with one of the provided protocols (lines 8-9, pg. 7 of Chapter 3 from Mod_SSL manual). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. and Mod_SSL manual to obtain the invention as specified in claim 23.

6. Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Krause et al. (U.S. Patent 6,070,198) and further in view of Smith et al. (U.S. Patent 6,801,927).

- a. Referring to Claim 20:

As per Claim 20, Krause et al. disclose the method according to claim 18. Krause et al. and Golan do not expressly disclose wherein the provided application program may be executed on a system which does

not include the provided security processing in the operating system kernel, in which case the calls operate to perform security processing instead of selectably securing the at least one communication of the executing application program. However, Smith et al. disclose the network adapter card, connected to the server computer, with security processing capability stored in the memory of the network adapter card, rather than in the kernel of the operating system, for off-loading the CPU task while performing the security to the communicating application

[Server 106 includes non-volatile memory 110, working memory 112, server mass data storage 114, a processing unit 116, and one or more user input/output (I/O) devices 118, all intercommunicating via a server bus 120 (e.g., PCI bus). Non-volatile memory 110 (e.g., read-only memory and/or one or more hard-disk drives) provides storage for data and code which is retained even when server 106 is powered down. Working memory 112 (e.g., random access memory) provides operational memory for server 106, and includes executable code (e.g., an operating system) which is loaded into working memory 112 during start-up (lines 6-16, Col. 5). The invention facilitates off-loading the connection management burden from the host CPU to an adapter card interposed between the network and the host bus (lines 62-64, Col. 1). FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing application proxies module 208 to include a

plurality of application specific proxies 208(1-f), including a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) proxy 208(1), a pass-through proxy 208(2), a security proxy 208(3), a caching proxy 208(4), and an "other" proxy 208(f) (lines 16-21, Col 7 and Fig. 1, 2, and 3); *where the security proxy performs the security processing for the application when the security system does not have security processing capability in the kernel space of the operating system*].

Krause et al. and Smith et al. are from similar technology relating to network security communications. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention was made to combine Krause et al. with Smith et al. to have the security processing off-loaded to adapter card when it is not available in the kernel space since one would be motivated to off-load the connection management burden from the host CPI to an adapter card interposed between the network and the host bus (lines 62-64, Col. 1 from Smith et al.). Therefore, it would have been obvious to combine Krause et al. with Smith et al. to obtain the invention as specified in claim 20.

Response to Arguments

7. Applicant's amendments filed on Jun. 14, 2006, has Claims 1, 10, 11, 25, and 26 amended. Among these amended claims, Claims 1, 25, and 26 are the

independent claims that have been modified. This necessitates the new grounds of rejection. Please see rejections above.

8. In regard to Applicant's argument that the cited reference by Krause does not disclose that an application program invokes the ifconfig function to selectably secure a communication of the application program as recited in the amended claim 1, different citation from Krause has been found and used in rejection of the amended independent claim 1 (see lines 21-31, Col. 13 and above rejections).

Conclusion

9. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.

- a. Tarquini (U.S. Pub. 2003/0084329) discloses a method of preventing intrusions on a node of a network comprising monitoring, by a first layer of

an intrusion prevention system, application data of applications running at on the node, monitoring, by a second layer of the intrusion prevention system, transport layer data of the node, and monitoring, by a third layer of the intrusion prevention system, network layer data of the node is provided. A computer-readable medium having stored thereon a set of instructions to be executed, the set of instructions, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform a computer method of monitoring application layer data, by a first layer of an intrusion prevention system comprised of the instructions, of a node of a network, the node comprising the processor, monitoring transport layer data, by a second layer of the intrusion prevention system, of the node of the network; and monitoring network layer data, by a third layer of an intrusion prevention system, of the node of the network is provided. A node of a network, comprising a central processing unit, a memory module for storing data in machine readable format for retrieval and execution by the central processing unit, and an operating system comprising a network stack comprising a protocol driver, a media access control driver, the memory module storing an instance of an intrusion protection system application operable to monitor application layer data and an intrusion prevention system transport service provider layer, and the operating system having an intrusion prevention system network filter service provider bound to the media access control driver and the protocol driver is provided.

- b. Krause et al. (U.S. Patent 5,815,707) disclose an extension to the STREAMS framework, referred to as dynamic function replacement, uses data structures that contain function pointers which allow STREAMS to execute various module or driver functions without requiring framework modification, or understanding what these functions actually do beyond their rudimentary classifications. This provides a simple, yet elegant, mechanism for replacing these function definitions and, hence, changing the execution behavior of STREAMS modules and drivers without requiring the modules or drivers to be rewritten or modified.

10. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Yin-Chen Shaw whose telephone number is 571-272-8593. The examiner can normally be reached on 8:00 to 4:00 M-F.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Kim Yen Vu can be reached on 571-272-3859. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.


Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair->

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YCS

Dec. 09, 2006



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